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Abstract 
J. C. Nyiri has argued in a series of papers that Ludwig Wittgenstein is a conservative 
philosopher. In ‘Wittgenstein 1929-31: The Turning Back’ Nyiri cites Wittgenstein’s 
admiration for Grillparzer as well as overtly philosophical passages from On Certainty 
in support of that thesis. I argue, in opposition to Nyiri, that we should separate Witt-
genstein’s political remarks from his philosophical remarks and that nothing Wittgen-
stein says in his philosophical work obviously implies a conservative viewpoint, or any 
other kind of political viewpoint. In his philosophical work Wittgenstein was concerned 
with untangling conceptual confusions rather than with putting forward a political 
viewpoint and the two kinds of activities are quite different. There is, however, some 
evidence of elements of conservatism in the stances that Wittgenstein took on political 
issues although there is also some evidence of sympathy for left-wing views, particu-
larly during the ‘late’ period of Wittgenstein’s work after he returned to philosophy at 
the end of the 1920s. Wittgenstein’s philosophical work cannot be claimed by people of 
any particular political persuasion as their own but it can be used to untangle philo-




I – Introduction 
 
he question of whether Wittgenstein was a conservative philosopher has gene-
rated a large literature[1]. Given the enormous scope of the literature there will 
not be space here to consider all of the various arguments in favour of deeming 
Wittgenstein a conservative. In particular many have focussed in on Wittgenstein’s 
claim in §124 of the Philosophical Investigations that philosophy “leaves everything as 
it is”. That remark alone is deserving of a paper to itself and if controversies surround-
ing Wittgenstein’s remarks about rule-following, rationality, and relativism were taken 
into consideration a sizable book could be written on the topic. I will restrict myself 
here to the arguments found in J. C. Nyiri’s paper ‘Wittgenstein 1929-31: The Turning 
Back’. 
The evidence brought by each side of the debate about whether Wittgenstein was con-
servative can be roughly divided into evidence concerning Wittgenstein’s occasional 
remarks directly concerning political matters and evidence from amongst Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical remarks. The reason I say ‘roughly’ divided is that there is some contro-
versy about the extent to which this division can be made. Within Wittgenstein’s type-
scripts each kind of remark would not be clearly separated; a remark about politics 
might be followed by a remark about philosophy, and philosophers might think that 
T 
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there is no clear division between the two kinds of remark (or that there aren’t two kinds 
of remark at all). In this paper I will treat the political remarks and philosophical re-
marks separately and I hope that by the end of the paper it will become clearer how a 
separation can be made. I will argue that philosophical remarks that have been cons-
trued as having political implications do not in fact have the implications that some 
commentators have suggested. 
If we can separate out the two kinds of remark then there are really two questions to 
answer. Firstly we can ask whether Wittgenstein was conservative in his political views 
and secondly we can ask whether Wittgenstein’s philosophical remarks have conserva-
tive political implications. To the first question my answer will be that Wittgenstein 
certainly held some political views that can be deemed conservative (although he also 
held some views that could be characterized as left-wing). But my answer to the second 
question will be that Wittgenstein’s philosophical views are perfectly consistent with 
radical left-wing views and have no conservative implications. Before looking at the 
evidence that Wittgenstein held conservative political views we must first have some 
understanding of what conservatism is. 
II – What is conservatism? 
One thing worth getting clear about when discussing conservatism is that the members 
of conservative parties are not necessarily conservative in their philosophical outlook 
and even if they are conservative they may well disagree on many questions. Right-
wing liberals have allied themselves with conservatives against the common enemy of 
socialism. As Anthony Quinton notes in his account of conservatism, “…conservative 
parties have absorbed so many right-wing liberals…that at times the truly conservative 
element in them has been almost overwhelmed by liberal individualism”[2]. This alli-
ance of liberal individualism and conservatism can be seen in one of the most prominent 
Conservative Prime Ministers of the past few decades, Margaret Thatcher. She led the 
Conservative Party in Britain between 1975 and 1990 (she was Prime Minister from 
1979-1990) and she was a great admirer of the right-wing liberal individualist Friedrich 
Hayek. Hayek himself explicitly disassociated himself from conservatism in his book 
The Constitution of Liberty, to which he appended a postscript, entitled ‘Why I am not a 
conservative’[3]. The stress on liberty, and especially a stress on the importance of free 
markets, is characteristic of right-wing liberalism rather than conservatism[4], although 
the two are often found in combination nowadays. 
In the entry on conservatism in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy 
Quinton identifies three central doctrines of conservatism: traditionalism, scepticism 
(concerning political knowledge) and the conception of human beings and society as 
being organically related[5]. According to conservatives societies are like biological 
organisms in that the parts (organs) all play their role in the functioning of the whole 
and cannot flourish independently of the whole. Each organ has its place and its role 
and each organ depends on the whole in order to play that role. Similarly, in societies 
individuals have their proper place and their proper roles to fulfil and they cannot flou-
rish except by being part of a wider whole, their society. This organicism supports 
sceptical claims about political knowledge. Individuals are imperfect in that they cannot 
flourish independently of society. No individual can grasp the whole and so theories 
formulated by individuals will inevitably be imperfect. Radically altering one aspect of 
society will have ramifying effects throughout all of society and so drastic change is to 
be avoided because it will have unpredictable results. Society is enormously complex 
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and interrelated. Any changes made should be gradual and should respect the wisdom 
that has accumulated in long-standing traditional institutions. According to conservati-
ves traditional institutions should be maintained (conserved) and if change is felt to be 
necessary we should proceed cautiously, remembering that drastic change could have 
drastic negative effects elsewhere in society. 
In his article ‘Wittgenstein 1929-31: The Turning Back’ J. C. Nyiri relies upon a cha-
racterisation of conservatism that is closely related to the one given above that was pre-
sented by Klaus Epstein in his book The Genesis of German Conservatism[6]. The or-
ganicism, deemed by Quinton to be a central doctrine of conservatism, can be seen in 
Epstein’s claim that conservatives, “…tend to emphasize the importance of variety whe-
reas their opponents stress general norms”. This supports scepticism about political 
knowledge (Quinton’s second central doctrine of conservatism) in that individuals are 
unlikely to be able to grasp the whole through norms or generalisations because there is 
such a great variety of people in a great variety of roles. This means that “…the syste-
matic application of reason to political, economic and religious problems usually leads 
to disastrous results” and supports the third strand of conservatism identified by Quin-
ton, traditionalism. So all of the strands identified by Quinton are present in the account 
of conservatism that Nyiri relies upon in his article discussing Wittgenstein’s politics. 
However, some social theorists have claimed that characterizations of conservatism like 
those given above are not sufficient. After all, the belief that change should be gradual 
and a belief in the interrelatedness (and variety) of people is just as compatible with 
reformist socialism as it is with those more usually associated with conservatism. Ge-
orge Nash, the author of a classic work on conservatism, notes that “[e]ven Fabian So-
cialists who believed in ‘the inevitability of gradualness’ might be labelled conservati-
ves”[7] and Corey Robin, in his recent book about conservatism, The Reactionary 
Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin, takes this as a sign that more 
needs to be said in order to correctly characterize conservatism. Robin suggests that 
conservatism is “…a meditation on – and theoretical rendition of – the felt experience 
of having power, seeing it threatened, and trying to win it back” . He argues, plausibly, 
that conservatives do not actually protect long-standing institutions unless those insti-
tutions fit with the interests of those in power. So conservatives defend the family and 
the nation but they do not view trade unions as valuable defenders of the rights of wor-
kers, despite the fact that trade unions have evolved and survived for many years. This 
fits with the fact that prominent conservative writers have often written in response to 
revolutionary movements or movements of oppressed groups. For example, Edmund 
Burke, the paradigmatic conservative philosopher, wrote in response to the French re-
volution and Salisbury, the Conservative prime minister wrote that “hostility to Radica-
lism, incessant, implacable hostility, is the essential definition of Conservatism. The 
fear that the Radicals may triumph is the only final cause that the Conservative Party 
can plead for its own existence”[9]. This leads Robin to claim that conservatism can be 
partially defined as “opposition to the liberation of men and women from the fetters of 
their superiors, particularly in the private sphere” . So, to conclude this section, we can 
see conservatism as a combination of organicism (with regard to the relation between 
individual and society), scepticism (about knowledge of society and of politics), traditi-
onalism, and the defence of power. 
 
III – Wittgenstein’s Politics 
Revista  Estudos  Hum(e)anos  
ISSN 2177-1006 
Número 8, 2014/1 
 
 50 
(i) Evidence that Wittgenstein held conservative views 
Wittgenstein’s attitudes towards women 
One area of politics in which it seems quite clear that Wittgenstein held conservative 
views is the area of women’s rights. There is evidence from a number of sources over 
the course of many years which tell us that Wittgenstein held sexist views. For example, 
David Pinsent, a close friend of Wittgenstein’s, records in his diary on February 7th, 
1913 that “[w]e talked about Woman suffrage: he [Wittgenstein] is very much against it 
– for no particular reason except that ‘all the women he knows are such idiots’. He said 
that at Manchester University the girl students spend all their time flirting with the pro-
fessors. Which disgusts him very much – as he dislikes half measures of all sorts, and 
disapproves of anything not deadly in earnest.”[11] 
Evidence from other sources suggests that Wittgenstein continued to hold sexist views. 
Fania Pascal attended meetings of the Moral Science Club at Cambridge where 
Wittgenstein spoke (in 1930-31) and then later gave Wittgenstein lessons in Russian (in 
the mid-1930s) and became a personal friend of his. She claims that Wittgenstein “dis-
liked intellectual women and in company literally turned his back on them”[12]. This is 
corroborated by the physicist Freeman Dyson, who lived nearby to Wittgenstein and 
had some interaction with him. Dyson claims that “he was, of course, always extremely 
insulting to women. He couldn’t tolerate women coming to his lectures. He would just 
simply be so rude that they would have to leave. So a thoroughly disagreeable charac-
ter.”[13] Pascal explicitly describes Wittgenstein as conservative in the early 1930s. She 
claims that, “at a time when intellectual Cambridge was turning Left he was still an old-
time conservative of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire.”[14] 
There is some suggestion that Wittgenstein was not quite as extreme in his sexism as 
Dyson suggests. We know that Wittgenstein’s lectures were attended by, amongst 
others, Margaret Masterman, Alice Ambrose, Elizabeth Anscombe, Iris Murdoch, and 
Margaret Macdonald. Masterman and Ambrose were members of the select group of 
students that made the notes which form Wittgenstein’s Blue Book, and Ray Monk, one 
of Wittgenstein’s biographers, describes them as being amongst Wittgenstein’s favou-
rite students[15]. Elizabeth Anscombe became a close friend of Wittgenstein’s, and later 
translated his Philosophical Investigations, but it seems she was one of a few exceptions 
to Wittgenstein’s general dislike of academic women. According to Ray Monk Ans-
combe became an ‘honorary male’, “addressed affectionately by him as ‘old man’”. 
Monk relates a story of Wittgenstein saying to Anscombe, “‘[t]hank God we’ve got rid 
of the women!’” at a lecture when he found that there were no other female students left 
in attendance.[16] 
So it is fairly clear that Wittgenstein was sexist but what makes this attitude a conserva-
tive one? In the first place it is a defence of the status quo, and a defence of the way that 
things have traditionally been. Women did not have the right to vote in Britain in 1913, 
when Wittgenstein announced his opposition to women’s suffrage. There is also a kind 
of organicism in the idea that women should play a different role in society to men and 
Wittgenstein’s attitudes accord with Corey Robin’s claim that conservatism involves 
“opposition to the liberation of men and women from the fetters of their superiors, par-
ticularly in the private sphere.” So it is safe to conclude that Wittgenstein was conser-
vative in at least one respect; in terms of his attitudes towards women. 
Hostility to Marxism 
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There is further evidence of Wittgenstein’s conservatism, or at least hostility to left-
wing views, in what people who knew him recount of what he said about Marxism. 
Wittgenstein had some acquaintance with the works of Marx and Lenin and his opinion 
of their works was in some respects quite low. Rush Rhees reports that Wittgenstein 
“used to speak with disgust of Marx’s phrase ‘congealed labour time’” and that “he 
could imagine that many people would find Marx an infuriating writer to read”[17] and 
according to M. O’C. Drury Wittgenstein said that “Lenin’s writings about philosophy 
are of course absurd”[18]. When Rush Rhees said to Wittgenstein that he was thinking 
of joining the Revolutionary Communist Party Wittgenstein tried to dissuade him from 
doing so on the basis that as a philosopher you should always be prepared to change 
direction and being loyal to a party would not allow you the necessary flexibility to 
change course. 
Of course, opposition to organised Marxism is not sufficient to label somebody a con-
servative but it is true, at least, that conservatives would share Wittgenstein’s hostility to 
organised Marxism. However, there is some unclarity about the extent to which 
Wittgenstein really did oppose Marxism and that will be discussed later, in section III 
(ii). 
Wittgenstein’s admiration of conservative thinkers 
In his article ‘The Turning Back’[19] J. C. Nyiri argues that one thing to be said in fa-
vour of the thesis that Wittgenstein was conservative is that he admired Grillparzer and 
Grillparzer was a conservative thinker (as well as being a famous poet). In fact 
Wittgenstein’s grandmother on his father’s side of the family, Fanny Figdor, was perso-
nally acquainted with Grillparzer[20]. Nyiri notes that Wittgenstein made reference to 
Grillparzer in his notebooks on three occasions between 1929 and 1931. In the first note 
Wittgenstein talks about Grillparzer as a ‘good Austrian’. Wittgenstein says that “[t]he 
good Austrian (Grillparzer, Lenau, Bruckner, Labor) is especially difficult to un-
derstand”[21]. In the second note Wittgenstein quotes Grillparzer as saying: “How easy 
it is to move about in broad distant regions, how hard to grasp what is individual & near 
at hand…”[22] Nyiri suggests that the distinction here, between ‘broad distant regions’ 
and ‘what is individual & near at hand’ corresponds to the distinction between “concrete 
use of language and speculative chatter”[23] that conservatives want to make. Accor-
ding to Nyiri “[t]he conservative individual, with his preference for the concrete, for 
that which is given, is in fact always hostile to theory [i.e. ‘speculative chatter’]”[24]. In 
the third remark Wittgenstein says that “[i]n Bruckner’s music nothing is left of the long 
& slender (nordic?) face of Nestroy, Grillparzer, Haydn, etc. but it has in full measure a 
round full (alpine?) face even purer in type than was Schubert’s”. It is difficult to see 
how this third remark can be construed as suggestive of conservatism in Wittgenstein’s 
thought, indeed it is difficult to make sense of at all. Nyiri suggests that in order to un-
derstand the remark we must place it in the context of the other remarks nearby. In par-
ticular, immediately after this remark Wittgenstein said that, “[t]he power of language to 
make everything look the same which appears in its crassest form in the dictionary & 
which makes it possible to personify time, something which is no less remarkable than 
would have been making divinities of the logical constants”. Nyiri claims that the con-
text of the remark suggests that what connects the remark with those surrounding it is 
“the idea of original multiplicity, of diversity”[25] and emphasis on diversity is charac-
teristic of conservatism. Nyiri cites Klaus Epstein’s definition of conservatism in sup-
port of his view. Epstein suggests that “[c]onservatives…tend to emphasize the impor-
tance of variety, whereas their opponents stress general norms”[26]. 
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Moreover, Nyiri does not just cite instances where Wittgenstein mentions or quotes 
Grillparzer. He proposes that conservative remarks are present in Wittgenstein’s more 
overtly philosophical work. Examples of such remarks, Nyiri says, include some that 
have been published in On Certainty. According to Nyiri’s interpretation, Wittgenstein 
maintains that we must “recognise certain authorities in order to be able to make jud-
gements at all”[27] (OC, §493). Nyiri claims, on the basis of §§47, 644 and 94 in On 
Certainty, that the authorities Wittgenstein thinks we must respect include “one’s 
school, or an inherited picture of the world”[28]. This kind of respect for inherited ins-
titutions fits with the traditionalism of conservatism mentioned above and could perhaps 
also be seen as a defence of those in power. 
(ii) – Evidence which suggests that Wittgenstein was not conservative 
In this section of the paper I intend to present evidence that Wittgenstein was not wholly 
conservative in his political opinions. The analysis presented by Nyiri is largely philo-
sophical in nature and so I will respond to that in section IV below. 
Wittgenstein’s admiration of left-wing thinkers 
It is clear that Wittgenstein saw something in Grillparzer’s views and that Grillparzer 
was a conservative. I will argue in section IV that what Wittgenstein gleaned from 
Grillparzer was more philosophical than political in nature and that Wittgenstein’s phi-
losophical views do not imply a conservative political philosophy. However, as has 
been noted many times already[29], Wittgenstein also admired thinkers on the left. His 
friends included people like Nikolai Bakhtin, described by Fania Pascal as “a fiery 
communist”[30], George Thomson; a Marxist classics lecturer at Birmingham who had 
a role in shifting Bakhtin’s politics to the left, and Pierro Sraffa, an economist who was 
friends with the Marxist Antonio Gramsci and who Wittgenstein credits as being the 
stimulus for ‘the most fruitful ideas’ of the Philosophical Investigations[31]. Wittgens-
tein was also was friends with the communist writer and activist, Maurice Dobb, and 
shared lodgings with him for a while[32]. 
But there is not just evidence that Wittgenstein was friends with many people on the 
left, there is also evidence that Wittgenstein had some sympathy for their views. Al-
though Wittgenstein said that he saw Lenin’s philosophical views as absurd he followed 
this by saying “at least he did want to get something done”[33] and although Wittgens-
tein disliked Marx’s way of expressing himself, Rush Rhees says that this did not mean 
that Wittgenstein objected to Marx’s views[34]. It is worth noting that Wittgenstein, on 
more than one occasion, expressed a desire to visit communist Russia, first in 1922[35] 
(soon after the Russian Revolution) and then in 1935, when he did in fact go to Rus-
sia[36]. Some have argued that his interest in Russia had nothing to do with left-wing 
sympathies and more to do with his asceticism or even his (alleged) conservatism. For 
example, Fania Pascal said that “[t]o my mind, his feeling for Russia would have had at 
all times more to do with Tolstoy’s moral teachings, with Dostoevsky’s spiritual in-
sights, than with any political or social matters”[37]. 
However, there is evidence that there was more to Wittgenstein’s motivations than this. 
In a letter of introduction that J. M. Keynes wrote to Ivan Maisky, the Russian ambas-
sador in London, on behalf of Wittgenstein Keynes said that Wittgenstein “has strong 
sympathies with the way of life which he believes the new regime in Russia stands 
for”[38]. What did Wittgenstein believe the regime in Russia stood for? According to 
Rush Rhees “Wittgenstein would say [towards the end of the Second World War] ‘the 
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important thing is that the people have work’…He thought the new regime in Russia did 
provide work for the mass of the people…He also thought it would be terrible if the 
society were ridden by ‘class distinctions’”[39]. In a footnote Rhees adds “[w]hen I said 
that the ‘rule by bureaucracy’ in Russia was bringing in class distinctions there, he told 
me ‘if anything could destroy my sympathy with the Russian regime, it would be the 
growth of class distinctions’” . Furthermore, Ray Monk cites Wittgenstein’s friend, Ge-
orge Thomson as saying that Wittgenstein’s attitude towards Marxism was that “[h]e 
was opposed to it in theory but supported it in practice” and Monk notes that “[t]his 
chimes with a remark Wittgenstein made to Rowland Hutt…: ‘I am a communist, at 
heart’”. Monk concludes that “[t]here is no doubt that during the political upheavals of 
the mid-1930s Wittgenstein’s sympathies were with the working class and the unem-
ployed, and that his allegiance, broadly speaking, was with the Left”[40]. 
So it seems that Wittgenstein’s interest in Russia did have something to do with politi-
cal and social matters. Wittgenstein admired the Russian regime for providing full-em-
ployment and for eradicating class distinctions (as he saw it). Wittgenstein, despite ha-
ving some serious reservations, had some respect for Marxist theory, and this can be 
seen in the fact that he used the formulation “the transition ‘from quantity to qua-
lity’”[41] in §284 of the Philosophical Investigations which is drawn ultimately from 
Hegel but which later appeared as Engels’ ‘first law’ of dialectics. And there is new 
evidence from Rush Rhees’ notes of conversations with Wittgenstein, published in 
Mind recently, that Wittgenstein was thinking of Marxist ideas in this passage. Accor-
ding to Rhees, “Marx got the phrase from Hegel but I think Wittgenstein had Marxist 
ideas in mind here”[42]. This is not to suggest that Wittgenstein was a full-blown 
communist but it does at least indicate that Wittgenstein was not conservative in all of 
his political views. Wittgenstein was deeply conservative in his attitudes towards wo-
men but this did not form part of a wider conservative outlook when Wittgenstein was 
working on his later philosophy. 
IV – Wittgenstein’s Philosophy 
(i) Nyiri on Wittgenstein and Grillparzer 
In this section I will pick up on the second of the questions I raised in the introduction: 
do Wittgenstein’s philosophical remarks have conservative implications? I will start by 
looking at Nyiri’s arguments concerning Wittgenstein and the conservative poet Franz 
Grillparzer and then move on to look at the remarks in On Certainty mentioned by 
Nyiri. 
Nyiri proposed that Wittgenstein’s admiration for Grillparzer and his own family’s con-
nections with Grillparzer were good evidence that Wittgenstein was conservative. It 
should be clear, first of all, that a family connection and a remark from Wittgenstein 
about the good Austrian work of Grillparzer (amongst others) do not constitute solid 
evidence that Wittgenstein was conservative. Your grandmother’s acquaintances do not 
all necessarily hold the same politics as you do and it is possible to have admiration for 
a poet’s work without agreeing with their politics. The second remark from Wittgens-
tein about Grillparzer was a quote from Grillparzer and we should ask whether it is a 
case of Wittgenstein highlighting something that he saw as good in Grillparzer’s con-
servatism. However, it is far from clear that this was Wittgenstein’s intention. The pas-
sage in question was: “How easy it is to move about in broad distant regions, how hard 
it is to grasp what is individual and near at hand”. Nyiri defended this as an expression 
of conservative politics by arguing that Wittgenstein was here contrasting concrete uses 
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of language and speculative chatter. Conservatives, according to Nyiri, favour concrete 
uses of language (“individual and near”) over speculative chatter (“broad distant re-
gions”) because they doubt that theorising about society is worthwhile, or even whether 
it is possible. But there are clear suggestions elsewhere in Wittgenstein’s work that the 
contrast between concrete uses and speculative chatter is not what he had in mind. In the 
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein looks to the correct use of ordinary terms in 
contrast to the misuse of terms by earlier philosophers. The contrast that Wittgenstein 
has in mind in the Investigations is the contrast between sense and nonsense. So, for 
example, at §39 Wittgenstein picks apart referentialist ‘theories’ of meaning by arguing 
that 
 
…it is clear that the sentence ‘Nothung has a sharp blade’ has a sense 
whether Nothung is still whole or has already been shattered. But if 
‘Nothung’ is the name of an object, this object no longer exists when 
Nothung is shattered into pieces; and as no object would then correspond to 
the name, it would have no meaning. But then the sentence ‘Nothung has a 
sharp blade’ would contain a word that has no meaning, and hence the sen-
tence would be nonsense. But it does have a sense… 
 
Wittgenstein makes a similar point when he argues that “[w]hen Mr N. N. dies, one says 
that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. And it would be nonsensical 
to say this, for if the name ceased to have meaning, it would make no sense to say ‘Mr 
N. N. is dead’” (PI §40). Later on in the Investigations Wittgenstein clearly connects the 
tasks of philosophy with this distinction between sense and nonsense when he says that 
“[t]he results of philosophy are the discovery of some piece of plain nonsense and the 
bumps that the understanding has got by running up against the limits of language” (PI 
§119). Seen in this light it seems plausible that Wittgenstein was not contrasting ‘con-
crete’ uses of language with speculative chatter about how to organize society, as Nyiri 
argues, rather he was contrasting broad attempts to grasp the essence of language or 
some other phenomenon (which lead us into speaking nonsense) and particular, correct, 
ordinary uses of language (which make sense). His discussion of the nature of philoso-
phy in the Philosophical Investigations suggests that Wittgenstein wanted to look clo-
sely at particular uses of language in order to dissolve philosophical problems that arise 
“when language goes on holiday”, i.e. when people do not use words correctly and end 
up speaking nonsense. So it is far from obvious that the passage from Grillparzer sup-
ports the view that Wittgenstein was a conservative. When Wittgenstein talks about that 
which is “individual and near” it seems plausible that he is talking about looking at par-
ticular, correct, ordinary uses of language in contrast to the “broad distant regions” of 
metaphysical nonsense. 
The final passage in Wittgenstein’s notebooks where he mentions Grillparzer is the one 
where he contrasts the ‘nordic’ face of Grillparzer with the ‘alpine’ face of Bruckner 
and Schubert. Nyiri tries to suggest that this passage is indicative of conservatism be-
cause it represents a kind of emphasis on diversity that conservatives favour. However, 
even if Wittgenstein’s intention is to highlight diversity, it is unclear that an emphasis 
on diversity of any and every sort is characteristic of conservatism. For example, the 
conservative chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, has made a point of saying that 
having diverse cultures within a country does not work. At a meeting in Potsdam in 
2010 she said that “[t]his [multicultural] approach has failed, utterly failed”[43] . David 
Revista  Estudos  Hum(e)anos  
ISSN 2177-1006 
Número 8, 2014/1 
 
 55 
Cameron, the conservative Prime Minister of Great Britain, made the same point in 
2011 at a conference in Munich soon after [44]. This may not be the kind of diversity 
(cultural diversity) that Nyiri had in mind but if he does not have this kind of emphasis 
on diversity in mind it seems a little implausible that we are to look for the diversity 
favoured by conservatives in the particular instances mentioned by Wittgenstein (i.e. 
‘faces’, musical styles, kinds of poetry)[45]. And even if we were to accept that the pas-
sage about Bruckner was suggestive of conservatism in Wittgenstein’s political views it 
would not demonstrate that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is conservative. 
Nyiri argues that the third passage in Wittgenstein’s notebooks about Grillparzer (about 
his ‘nordic’ face) is to be understood in the light of the comment Wittgenstein makes 
afterwards. This is where Wittgenstein talks about “[t]he power of language to make 
everything look the same…which makes it possible to personify time, something which 
is no less remarkable than would have been making divinities of the logical constants”. 
Rather than interpreting this, as Nyiri does, as representing a conservative stress on di-
versity, it would perhaps be more natural to interpret it again in the light of Wittgens-
tein’s remarks about the nature of philosophy, sense, and nonsense. Given that 
Wittgenstein makes mention of the ‘divinity’ of the logical constants here it would 
make sense to interpret this as a remark which has his predecessors in the philosophy of 
logic in mind. When Wittgenstein was writing his later philosophy he often attacked the 
referentialism and philosophy of logic associated with Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Rus-
sell. The natural way to interpret the comment would be as an attack on their philosophy 
which, as Wittgenstein saw it, obscured the understanding of language by assimilating 
expressions to one another[46] and which made the mistake of thinking that the logical 
constants must refer to entities (a view which he attacked in both his early and his later 
work). The point is that it is more natural to understand Wittgenstein as making a philo-
sophical point here (i.e. as one to do with language, logic, sense, and nonsense) rather 
than as making a political point about the superiority of conservatism over its left-wing 
or liberal rivals. Indeed, in The Blue Book Wittgenstein says something similar to the 
passage quoted by Nyiri in the context of discussing conceptual confusions surrounding 
the notion of ‘time’. There he says that, “[i]f we look into the grammar of that word, we 
shall feel that it is no less astounding that man should have conceived a deity of time 
than it would be to conceive of a deity of negation or disjunction.”[47] 
Similarly, it is more natural to understand Wittgenstein as making philosophical points 
(which are consistent with any political ideology) in the remarks that Nyiri cites from 
On Certainty than it is to understand them as in some way expressing sympathy for con-
servative political views. For example, Nyiri cites §47 from On Certainty in support of 
his argument because it mentions school as an authority. What Wittgenstein actually 
says is, “[t]his is how one calculates. Calculating is this. What we learn at school, for 
example. Forget this transcendent certainty which is connected with your concept of 
spirit”. The context for this remark is a discussion of the concepts of ‘knowledge’, 
‘doubt’, ‘certainty’, and ‘belief’. Wittgenstein has moved on from discussing Moore’s 
claims to know things like ‘here is a hand’ and is discussing knowledge and certainty in 
the area of mathematics. An earlier passage sheds some light on what is going on in 
§47: 
 
Knowledge in mathematics: Here one has to keep on reminding oneself of 
the unimportance of the ‘inner process’ or ‘state’ and ask “Why should it be 
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important? What does it matter to me?” What is interesting is how we use 
mathematical propositions. (OC §38) 
 
So the context is one in which Wittgenstein is arguing that we should move away from 
thinking about knowledge as an inner state (this is conceptually confused, as Wittgens-
tein argues elsewhere[48]) towards looking at how we actually use mathematical propo-
sitions. In §47 he is recommending that we move away from the conception of certainty 
that is associated with confused views of the mind (e.g. the view that knowledge is a 
mental state) and look at how mathematical propositions are learnt and used in practice. 
Wittgenstein is talking about how the concepts of ‘calculating’ and ‘certainty’ are em-
ployed. He makes no comment in §47 about whether the ability to calculate must be 
acquired in a school – school is not seen as a necessary institution but as an instructive 
example – and nor does he make any comment on whether schools should be preserved 
as an institution or on whether, say, schoolchildren should respect school authorities. No 
conservative political point is made. The passage is part of an extended discussion 
which is intended to make our use of various related concepts (‘calculate’, ‘knowledge’, 
‘certainty’, ‘doubt’, ‘belief’ and so on) more perspicuous with the aim of dissolving 
epistemological problems (for example, scepticism is compared to the “hypothesis of 
our having miscalculated in all our calculations”[49] – with the purpose of showing that 
neither is a possible hypothesis). Wittgenstein does, in a way, suggest that we should 
respect an authority. What we should respect is the correct uses of these terms. We 
should respect the correct uses of these terms if we do not want to be led astray into 
talking nonsense and get caught up in philosophical confusion. This is quite different to 
the conservative emphasis on respecting authorities such as the church, political autho-
rities, and school teachers, which Wittgenstein makes no comment on. 
V – Conclusion 
So I conclude that none of the philosophical remarks in Wittgenstein’s work discussed 
by Nyiri in his article endorse or imply a conservative viewpoint. Wittgenstein’s philo-
sophy concerns confusions about concepts rather than grappling with ideological pro-
blems either directly or indirectly. There is some evidence that Wittgenstein was con-
servative, at least in some respects, in his politics, but his philosophical work does not 
have any obvious political implications. I leave open the possibility that it might no-
netheless have non-obvious political implications. My principal concern here has been 
to demonstrate that some of the arguments offered in favour of Wittgenstein being con-
servative, by the likes of Nyiri, miss their mark[50]. 
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